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Christopher A. Pissarides
In this paper we demonstrate that when labor is heterogenous and the match-
ing of skills with jobs below first-best, the introduction of trade may lead to
industrial agglomeration and inter-industry trade. Agglomeration takes place be-
cause the average quality of matches improves when the local market has a bigger
∗We thank Gilles Duranton, Gene Grossman and Tony Venables for their comments. A
previous version of this paper was presented at the CEPR Workshop “The Economic Geography
of Europe: Measurement, Testing and Policy Simulations,” Villars, 18/19 January 2002.
pool of workers and firms to choose from. The force against agglomeration is the
existence of trade costs. At zero trade costs regions that can trade always special-
ize, whereas when there are positive trade costs they may or may not specialize,
depending on the values taken by several other parameters.
Our model resembles other models in new trade theory, except that there are
heterogeneities in the performance of tasks done by apparently similar workers.
Ex ante workers appear identical and no worker is more productive than another
across the whole range of jobs. But some workers are more productive in some
jobs and other workers are more productive in other jobs. Labor productivity in
the model depends on technology, training and the other factors of conventional
production theory, but also on the quality of the match between the job and the
worker. We postulate that even when workers are allocated to the jobs where
they are most productive, companies that have specialized skill requirements can
recruit better-matched workers if they recruit in larger markets. We show that
when this feature is combined with features commonly assumed in new trade
theory, in particular increasing returns, diﬀerentiated goods and transport costs,
it alone can explain agglomeration by industries that use specialized skills.
Anecdotal evidence in favor of our hypothesis is easy to find. To give two
examples, one by an employer and one by an agent looking for employers, the
general manager of Sony UK recently explained why his company remains in high-
wage Britain: “What keeps us here is the quality of the staﬀ and the research and
development capacity” (Financial Times, January 19, 2002). On the other side
of the market, Gavin Clarkson, the owner of a software company but speaking as
a member of the Choktaw Nation of Oklahoma, was reported as planning to set
up a technical training centre in Oklahoma to attract companies because “Having
a critical mass of people who are highly skilled and resourced is what attracts
business to any location or community.” (Australian Financial Review,11 April
1999). The writers of the Financial Times article went further in arguing that
“The survival of struggling volume producers may or may not prove directly vital
to the economy as a whole but their role in providing skilled staﬀ and components
infrastructure for higher-margin niche manufacturers is hard to ignore.” The
contribution of “components infrastructure” to industrial agglomeration was the
theme of Krugman and Venables (1995). Our focus is on the role of “skilled staﬀ.”
Formal econometric evidence in favor of labor pooling was recently provided
by Dumais et al. (1997). Making use of the LRD manufacturing data base for the
Unites States, they examined the relative importance of Marshall’s three reasons
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for agglomeration for the location of manufacturing plants.1 They found that
labor pooling was by far the most important force for agglomeration, at least at
the metropolitan area level. Examining the location decisions of new entrants,
as well as the location of expanding and exiting firms, they found that the most
robust results obtained were for new entrants and that new entrants tended to
locate in areas where existing firms had similar labor requirements to their own.
The Dumais et al. (1997) research gives support to labour pooling as an
agglomeration force but does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent reasons that might
make it important. Indirect evidence, however, supports our matching reasons.
Match diﬀerentiation is likely to be more important for more advanced skills.
The routine tasks that dominate production in less advanced economies do not
aﬀord much scope for diﬀerentiation or creativity. But with the invention of more
complicated tasks, the routine nature of agricultural and industrial work gives
way to work situations which allow diﬀerent and varied types of performance. If
we are correct in claiming that this is a reason for agglomeration, agglomeration
should increase with economic growth and should be more prevalent in industries
that require more high-tech labor. Dumais et al. (1997) find that labor pooling
is especially strong as an agglomeration force in high technology industries.2
Our paper is related to three strands of literature. First is the “new eco-
nomic geography” literature, which shows that agglomeration of manufacturing
industries can arise when combined with inter-regional labour mobility (Krugman,
1991); or when combined with input/output linkages between vertically linked
firms (Krugman and Venables, 1995). The labor market is perfectly competitive
in both these models, so they do not share our reasons for agglomeration, but we
share the same new trade theoretical framework.
The second strand is the “labor pooling” literature. Krugman (1991) for-
malizes Marshall’s reasons for emphasizing labor pooling. He claims that labor
pooling is a way of achieving more eﬃciency when firms are exposed to idiosyn-
cratic risk, because when the number of firms in a region is large the law of large
numbers ensures that on average idiosyncratic shocks wash out.3 Rotemberg and
Saloner (2000) examine the case where skilled labor has to get trained, and iden-
1Marshall’s often quoted three reasons are proximity to suppliers and customers, labor pooling
and information spillovers.
2The main industries they list are fabricated metals, industrial machinery, electronic and
electrical equipment and instruments. Knowledge spillovers are also relatively more important
for these industries but not as important as labor pooling.
3Dumais et al. (1997) also find some evidence supporting this hypothesis. Labor pooling
appears to be a more important agglomeration force in industries with more volatile employment.
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tify a hold-up problem in the absence of labor pooling. A worker is more likely
to pay the up-front cost of training if she knows that there are many firms in her
town that will compete for her services. Competition ensures that she will recoup
the cost of her training through higher wages.
Our reason for agglomeration is diﬀerent both from Krugman’s and from
Rotemberg and Saloner’s. It is more closely related to the reasons for exter-
nal economies discussed by Henderson (1988), and to the agglomeration reason
invoked by Helsley and Strange (1990) in a Henderson-type model of city size.
Trade is absent from this literature strand. Helsley and Strange (1990) show that
the existence of matching externalities is a force pushing for the agglomeration of
production but the scarcity of land prohibits the agglomeration of all industry in
a single location. As more people gather in one location the marginal worker has
to live further away from the business center, and her travel costs oﬀset the gains
from the agglomeration. In contrast, land in our model is a free commodity and
location decisions are made by diﬀerentiated firms that can move from one region
to another.
Section 1 introduces our formal definition of heterogeneity and its connection
with labor skills. Sections 2-4 derive the microfoundations: the decisions of house-
holds and firms in the labor and goods markets. Section 5 derives the labor market
equilibrium and section 6 the aggregate equilibrium with and without trade. It
shows that with zero trade costs agglomeration dominates the symmetric equilib-
rium. In section 7 we report simulations that illustrate the relative importance of
heterogeneity and trade costs in the choice between symmetric and agglomeration
equilibrium. In section 8 we calculate the welfare eﬀects of the agglomeration and
symmetric equilibria, and show that agglomeration can impose welfare costs on
the country that fails to attract the specialist firms, even in the absence of trade
costs.
1. Diﬀerentiated workers
When an employer requires an unskilled worker to perform routine tasks, the main
concern is the wage rate at which labor is available. But as the work requirements
become more complicated, diﬀerentiation in jobs introduces the possibility of good
and bad matches between the requirements of the job and seemingly qualified job
applicants. Employers devote resources to targeting good applicants, screening
and training them, in their search for good matches. Our focus in this paper are
the implications of this conjecture for the location decisions of firms and their
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consequences for market size.
We make four critical assumptions about the mobility of goods and factors:
(a) there is perfect inter-sectoral and inter-regional mobility of capital, (b) there
is perfect inter-sectoral mobility of labor, (c) there is no inter-regional mobility of
labor, and (d) there is inter-regional trade. To facilitate modeling we make the
further assumption that there are only two types of jobs - one requiring simple
tasks, “agriculture,” and one requiring complicated tasks, “manufacturing.” All
workers employed in agriculture have the same productivity. We refer to these
workers as the unskilled and to those working in manufacturing as the skilled.
The productivity of skilled workers is on average higher than that of unskilled
workers, but varies with the quality of their match.
Other things equal (mainly wages and final demand), manufacturing employers
will want to locate in the market that improves their chances of a good match;
agricultural employers will be indiﬀerent about where they locate. Skilled workers
will also want to be in markets that give them a better chance of a good match.
Companies like the ones in our introductory remarks do not locate where land and
labor are cheaper and spend resources training their own employees, because they
do not know how good the quality of the match between the trained employee and
their job opening will turn out to be. It can be expensive to train workers until a
good match is found, especially in more advanced technologies, where labor skills
are more diﬀerentiated. But moving to a region where there are many trained
workers, each with his or her own idiosyncrasies, makes the selection of a good
match cheaper - and improves the expected productivity of the work force.4
All workers in our model are capable of performing unskilled tasks and this
option is always open to them. They can perform skilled tasks only by acquiring
training, for a cost. The agricultural sector has a constant returns to scale pro-
duction technology and is competitive, with a fixed wage rate that is normalized
to unity. In manufacturing there is a distribution of wages dictated by the qual-
ity of matches and mean productivity. By the assumption that all workers can
perform unskilled (agricultural) tasks the lower support of the wage distribution
in manufacturing is not less than 1, but its shape and actual limits are unknowns
of the model.
Training costs are measured in utility units and are borne by the worker.
4These ideas have implications for increasing returns to scale in search markets and how to
test for them that we do not explore here. For example, search time may actually be longer
in larger markets characterized by a variety of skills, because there is more selection, but the
productivity (and hence wage) of the match may also be larger.
5
This assumption simplifies the derivations, because it allows us to ignore the
cost of training in the calculation of national income. Because labor is mobile
between sectors, in the equilibrium of an economy with active manufacturing
and agricultural sectors the distribution of wages in the manufacturing sector
equates the expected utility of entering manufacturing with the utility of entering
the agricultural sector. If the economy produces only manufacturing goods the
wage distribution is determined by marginal productivity conditions and market
clearing.
We now model skill diﬀerentiation and the quality of the match. Skilled work-
ers are horizontally diﬀerentiated because of idiosyncratic characteristics that re-
veal themselves after training. No worker can vary these characteristics. Workers
can decide to train or not train, say go to school, without knowing exactly what
they will be good at once the training is complete. But once the training is com-
plete, both the worker and potential employers know exactly the worker’s skill
attributes. Matching then takes place such that the productivity of each worker
is the maximum possible given the revealed attributes.5
We assume that the quality of a match is unidimensional and is measured
by the “distance” of the worker from the firm.6 Skills are distributed along a
circle, whose circumference is of length 2H. H is a measure of the unobserved
heterogeneity of skills, of how far match-specific productivities can vary from
each other. If H = 0 there is no heterogeneity and all skilled workers have the
same productivity in all firms. When workers acquire their skill they are allocated
randomly on this circle, with all locations equally likely. This implies that the
density of workers on this circle is uniform, so if there are Ls workers on the circle
there will be dLs/2H workers in an arc of length d.
Unlike workers, firms can choose their location on the skills circle. A firm
can decide what specialization to seek and it recruits on that basis. The closer
a firm and a worker are on the circle the better the quality of their match. In
equilibrium, each firm and worker will be matched to the agent from the other
side located closest to them.
We assume that productivity is measured by “eﬀective” or “eﬃciency” units
5The introduction of matching frictions (e.g. imperfect information about potential employ-
ers) will add another dimension to the costs of the heterogeneities that we study. Although we
have not worked out formally the implications of frictions, we suspect that they will add to the
advantages of agglomeration, because a larger market is likely to reduce the mismatches due to
frictions.
6Helsley and Strange (1990) and Thisse and Zenou (2000) employ similar assumptions to
represent heterogeneity.
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of labour and that the productivity of a match depends linearly on the distance
between the firm and the worker on the skills circle. A worker who has a firm
located at exactly the same point as herself, inputs one eﬀective unit of labour
into that firm’s production function. If the worker is located a distance measure
d away, she inputs either 1 − d or zero units. We ignore negative or zero inputs
because they will never be equilibrium outcomes.7
2. The location of firms
Firms choose their location and post a wage for each eﬀective unit of labor sup-
plied by a worker and a price for each unit of output sold. They can therefore
exploit monopoly powers both in labor and in output markets. The labor input
is both observable and verifiable. Once the wage is posted, workers arrive and
the firm decides how many to recruit and how much to produce, given its produc-
tion function and the demand for its product. We assume that competition and
the assumption that the labor input can be monitored at zero cost lead to full
employment, although generally not at the competitive wage.
Although the model is static and the firm’s decisions - location, wage posting,
demand for labor and output pricing - maximize the unique profit function, it is
convenient to derive optimal actions in steps. We first derive the optimal loca-
tion decision for an arbitrary posted wage and show that the optimal location is
independent of the wage rate. We then use the location outcomes to derive the
supply of labor and the demand for output by households. Finally, we return to
the decisions facing firms and complete the derivation of equilibrium.
Intuitively, firms are more likely to get workers the further away they are from
other firms. Consider now the choice of location on the circle for given wages.
The criterion that we use for firm decisions is the constrained maximization of
profit. The labor-market constraint is the supply of eﬀective units to the firm
and the product-market constraint is the demand for its output. Therefore, given
an arbitrary wage posting wi, firm i will choose the location that maximizes the
eﬀective units of labor that it can attract, i.e., it will push the supply-of-labor
constraint as far out as possible.
In figure 1, two firms are located at points a and b on the circle and pay wages
wa and wb per eﬀective unit of labor respectively. A new firm i enters and for
7The coeﬃcient on d can be set equal to unity without loss of generality by appropriate choice
of units of measuring H. For example, because maximum distance is H, we can ensure that the
productivity of a match is never negative by restricting the range of H to the [0, 1] interval.
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given wage wi chooses its location s. A worker located at some point x to the left
of s is attracted to firm i if
wi(1− (s− x)) ≥ wa(1− (x− a)),
because if this worker goes to firm a she will supply 1− (x− a) eﬀective units at
wa each, whereas if she goes to firm i she will supply 1− (s− x) units at wi each.
Similarly, the firm attracts a worker located at point y to the right of s if
wi(1− (y − s)) ≥ wb(1− (b− y)).
It follows that firm i attracts all the workers between points s−1 and s+1 which
satisfy
wi(1− (s− s−1)) = wa(1− (s−1 − a)) (2.1)
wi(1− (s+1 − s)) = wb(1− (b− s+1)). (2.2)
With Ls workers uniformly distributed on the circle, the total number of workers
who travel from the left of s to join the firm is (s − s−1)Ls/2H and the average
number of eﬀective units of labor contributed by each one is (1 − (s − s−1)/2),
because on average each worker travels a distance (s − s−1)/2 to reach the firm.
Similarly, (s+1−s)Ls/2H workers travel from the right of s to work for the firm and
the average contribution of each worker to the firm’s labor input is (1−(s+1−s)/2).
It follows that if the firm locates at s its total eﬀective labor input is
LEsi =
Ls
2H
·
(s− s−1)
µ
1− s− s−1
2
¶
+ (s+1 − s)
µ
1− s+1 − s
2
¶¸
. (2.3)
The firm chooses its location to maximize (2.3) subject to (2.1) and (2.2), given
its rivals’ wages, and for any arbitrary wi.
The maximization conditions with respect to s, s−1 and s+1 satisfy
Ls
2H
(s+1 − s− (s− s−1))− wi(λ1 − λ2) = 0, (2.4)
− Ls
2H
(1− (s− s−1)) + λ1(wi + wa) = 0, (2.5)
Ls
2H
(1− (s+1 − s))− λ2(wi + wb) = 0, (2.6)
where λ1 and λ2 are Lagrangian multipliers associated with (2.1) and (2.2) re-
spectively.
8
It follows immediately from conditions (2.4)-(2.6) that λ1wa = λ2wb.We focus
on symmetric Nash equilibria, i.e., the equilibria implied by profit-maximizing
wage posting when all other firms post a common wage per eﬀective unit of labor.
We show later that such equilibria exist, indeed it is diﬃcult to see what the
alternative can be, given the assumptions of uniform skills distribution and the
consumption preferences assumed in the next section. Setting wa = wb, we derive
λ1 = λ2 for any positive wi, and so (2.4), (2.1) and (2.2) immediately yield that
the firm will locate exactly halfway between firm a and firm b : b− s = s− a.
It follows that if there are N manufacturing firms in the market, in equilibrium
the distance between any two firms is 2H/N and so the maximum distance that
workers have to cover to gain employment (i.e., the worst case of mismatch) is
H/N.8 With a uniform distribution of workers on the circle, the mean measure of
mismatch is H/2N.
To derive the supply of labor function that constrains firms, note that (2.1)
implies
s− s−1 =
wi − wa + wa(s− a)
wi + wa
(2.7)
and (2.2) similarly implies
s+1 − s =
wi − wb + wb(b− s)
wi + wb
. (2.8)
We have just proved that if wa = wb ≡ w, s−a = b−s = 2H/N. Substitution into
(2.7) and (2.8) and subsequently into (2.3) gives the supply of labor constraint
facing firm i for any arbitrary choice of wi :
LEsi =
Ls
2H
(wi − w + 2wH/N)(wi + 3w − 2wH/N)
(wi + w)2
. (2.9)
The partial derivative of this with respect to the own wage wi is a complicated
expression that cannot in general be signed, but at the symmetric equilibrium it
8When the rivals’ wages are not equal, firms locate closer to the low-wage rival than the
high wage rival. Perhaps unintuitively, this implies that they recruit over a longer range of the
skill distribution on the side of the high-wage rival than on the side of the low-wage rival. As a
consequence, workers who are located closer to high-wage firms but are not recruited by those
firms suﬀer bigger mismatches on average than workers located closer to low-wage firms. It
would appear from this that high-wage firms impose an externality on the workers that they
do not recruit. This property may have interesting implications for non-symmetric equilibrium,
which we do not pursue in this paper.
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simplifies to
∂LEsi
∂wi
|wi=w=
Ls
2Hw
> 0. (2.10)
The firm is facing an upward-sloping supply of labor curve. Restricting again
attention to the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we derive the elasticity of the labor
supply curve as the constant
∂LEsi
∂wi
wi
LEsi
|wi=w=
µ
H
2N
µ
1− H
2N
¶¶−1
> 0. (2.11)
Recalling that H/2N is the mean measure of mismatch in this economy, we de-
rive that in symmetric equilibrium the larger the mean mismatch the less elastic
the firm’s labor supply curve. With firms located further apart, competition for
workers in the labor market is less intense.
3. Households
Households supply one unit of labor each, either in the manufacturing sector or
in the agricultural sector. If they decide to enter agriculture, they know with
certainty that the wage rate will be 1. If they decide to enter manufacturing, they
have to train first for a cost and then discover their location on the skills circle,
and hence their realized wage. Once the wage is known they decide if they want
to remain in manufacturing or revert to agriculture, and make their consumption
decisions. Both household decisions, labor allocation and demand, are governed
by the maximization of a single utility function.
3.1. Demand functions
We assume that manufacturing goods are diﬀerentiated and each firm produces its
own variety i. Consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over these goods, which
are aggregated into a composite denoted by Cx. The output of agriculture is a
single good denoted by Ca. The utility function of individual k is
Uk = vkC
µ
xkC
1−µ
ak , 0 < µ < 1 (3.1)
where vk = t−1 if the individual decides to train and seek a manufacturing job and
vk = 1 otherwise. t > 1 is a parameter that measures the utility cost of training.
Higher t implies more expensive training. Our formulation makes training costs
10
akin to “iceberg” costs. The skilled worker loses a fraction of her utility when
transporting herself to the skilled labor pool, from which she is recruited by high-
wage firms.
We introduce traded goods in preparation for the subsequent analysis. Thus,
let N be the number of domestically produced manufacturing goods (the same as
the number of domestic manufacturing firms) and N∗ the number of foreign firms.
The sub-utility function for manufacturing goods is
Cxk =
"
NX
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
ik +
N∗X
j=1
³mjk
τ
´σ−1
σ
# σ
σ−1
σ > 1, τ ≥ 1, (3.2)
where cik is the consumption of the domestically-produced manufacturing good i,
mjk is the demand for the imported manufacturing good j, τ are iceberg trans-
portation costs and σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Let yk represent the income of individual k. The budget constraint is
NX
i=1
picik +
N∗X
j=1
p∗jmjk + PaCak = yk (3.3)
where pi is the price of good i, p∗j is the price of the imported good and Pa is
the price of the agricultural good. Define the price index of the manufacturing
composite good by
Px =
"
NX
i=1
p1−σi +
N∗X
j=1
¡
τp∗j
¢1−σ# 11−σ
. (3.4)
Maximization of the utility function for a given income level gives the following
demand functions for the manufacturing composite and the agricultural good:
PxCxk = µyk (3.5)
PaCak = (1− µ)yk, (3.6)
and for each manufacturing good:
cik = µ
µ
pi
Px
¶−σ
yk
Px
(3.7)
mjk = µ
µ
τp∗j
Px
¶−σ
τyk
Px
(3.8)
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Although utility functions are diﬀerent for skilled and unskilled workers, the
proportionality assumptions made on the cost of training ensure that demand
functions are identical, except for income diﬀerences. Aggregation over incomes
therefore gives the aggregate demand functions for each good and for the com-
posites. The aggregate demand functions have the same linear-expenditure form
as the individual functions and they are not written explicitly to save space. We
denote domestic aggregate income by Y.
3.2. Occupational choice
Workers are mobile between sectors and choose their sector to maximize their
utility function (3.1). By substitution from the demand functions into (3.1) we
derive the indirect utility function of individual k
Uk = vkµ
µ(1− µ)1−µP−µx P−(1−µ)a yk. (3.9)
Individuals who join the agricultural sector are characterized by vk = 1 and yk = 1
and those who train to join the manufacturing sector are characterized by vk = t−1
and their income is a random draw from the uniform distribution of wages. In
agriculture, a fixed coeﬃcients production function and competition ensures that
there are zero profits (hence, given the normalization for wages in agriculture, Pa
must also be equal to 1 in equilibrium and acts as the numeraire in this economy).
In manufacturing, free entry and exit of firms also ensures that there are zero
profits in equilibrium.
To derive the distribution of wages in manufacturing, we note that the max-
imum wage rate earned, by those with a perfect match, is w, the wage posted
per eﬀective unit in symmetric equilibrium. The lowest wage is earned by those
who have to travel maximum distance, which, with N firms, is H/N. Therefore,
the lowest wage rate is w(1−H/N) or 1, whichever is higher. We will derive the
solution under the assumption that w(1−H/N) is always above unity, i.e., that
no trained workers are forced back into agriculture because of poor matches. In
the simulations of section 7 this assumption is always satisfied.
Wages in manufacturing are uniformly distributed between w(1 −H/N) and
w, so the expected utility of a worker who chooses to get trained is
U¯k = t
−1µµ(1− µ)1−µP−µx P−(1−µ)a
Z w
w(1−H/N)
ykdF (yk)
= t−1µµ(1− µ)1−µP−µx P−(1−µ)a w(1−H/2N), (3.10)
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where F () is the uniform distribution. Inter-sectoral mobility of labor requires
that the expected utility of those who train themselves and join manufacturing
be equal to the utility of those who join agriculture, at least when both sectors
are active. From (3.9) and (3.10), and given that in agriculture vk = yk = 1, we
derive the condition implied by equality of the utility levels:
w(1−H/2N) = t > 1. (3.11)
With both sectors active, condition (3.11) gives a negative “compensating diﬀer-
entials” relation between the wage rate for each eﬀective unit of labor and the
number of firms. The intuition behind it is that for a given eﬀective wage rate,
the wage distribution in manufacturing with many firms dominates one with fewer
firms, because of better matches. The eﬀective wage rate then has to be lower to
compensate for the increased attractiveness of entering manufacturing.
4. Firms
Firms are wage and price setters. Their choice variables are their own wage rate
wi, which is constrained by (2.9), and their output price pi, which is constrained
by the individual demand functions (3.7), aggregated over all individuals.
The (inverted) production function for firm i is a linear function of the eﬀective
units of labor:
LEsi = α+ βxi, α,β > 0, (4.1)
where xi is the firm’s output and LEsi is the number of eﬀective units supplied to
the firm at its posted wage wi.
Firms maximize profit
πi = pixi − wiLEsi. (4.2)
Aggregation of demand in the domestic and foreign country yields, from (3.7) and
(3.8),
xdi = ci +m
∗
i
= µp−σi (P
σ−1
x Y + τ
1−σP ∗σ−1x Y
∗) (4.3)
where xdi is the total demand for good i, ci and mi are respectively home and
export demand and Y is aggregate income.
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Maximization of profit requires that the firm’s controls wi, pi, xi and LEsi satisfy
the equality xi = xdi , and the mark-up equation (under the symmetric equilibrium
assumption wi = w)
pi = w
µ
1 +
2H
Ls
LEsi
¶
σβ
σ − 1 . (4.4)
But in symmetric equilibrium (2.9) implies
LEsi = (1−
H
2N
)
Ls
N
, (4.5)
which simplifies the markup equation to
pi = w
µ
1 + 2
H
N
− H
2
N2
¶
σβ
σ − 1 . (4.6)
We note that H/N < 1, because 1−H/N is the number of eﬀective units supplied
by the most mismatched worker. Higher H/N implies that firms are located
further away from each other and so competition in the labor market is less intense
(as shown in (2.11), the elasticity of the supply of labor in this case is smaller).
It is therefore not surprising to find that higher H/N implies a higher markup of
prices over wages.
Freedom of entry and exit of manufacturing firms eliminates profits in equilib-
rium, which, when applied to (4.2) gives, by virtue of (4.6) and (4.1),
x =
α(σ − 1)
β
µ
1 + 2σ
H
N
− σH
2
N2
¶−1
. (4.7)
Unlike the typical Dixit-Stiglitz symmetric equilibrium found in trade models,
each firm’s output here is not constant, because the markup of prices on costs is
not constant. Market-size eﬀects work through both channels, variations in the
number of varieties (firms) and variations in firm size. By substituting (4.7) into
(4.1) we obtain the demand for eﬀective labor units by each manufacturing firm,
LEsi = ασ
1 + 2H
N
− H2
N2
1 + 2σH
N
− σH2
N2
. (4.8)
As before, higher H/N implies less competition in the labor market, the price
markup is higher and so each firm’s demand and output are lower and the demand
for labor is consequently also lower. This introduces a link from the number of
firms to each firm’s output: higherN implies more competition in the labor market
and so yields higher output per firm and more demand for labor.
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5. Labor-market equilibrium
The market in eﬀective units of labor clears. Because the equilibrium is symmetric,
we find the equilibrium by equating the supply of eﬀective labor units to each
firm with the demand for labor by the firm. Both expressions were derived in the
preceding section, the supply in (4.5) and the demand in (4.8). It is convenient to
introduce the notation n ≡ N/H, noting that n/2 is the density of firms on the
circle. We loosely refer to n as the density of firms or as the number of firms. We
re-write the supply and demand functions for labor to each individual firm as
LEsi =
2n− 1
n2
Ls
2H
(5.1)
LEsi = ασ
1 + (2n− 1)/n2
1 + σ(2n− 1)/n2 . (5.2)
Larger n implies that firms are closer together in the manufacturing sector, and
so the supply of eﬀective labor units to each individual firm is larger: ∂LEsi/∂n > 0.
For given n, the supply of labor to each firm increases in Ls/2H, the density of
workers in manufacturing, for obvious reasons. On the demand side, larger n
implies more competition in the labor market, and so the demand for labor is less.
Labor-market clearing requires equality between demand and supply. Equality
gives, for each H, a relation between the number of manufacturing firms and the
total supply of skilled labor, which we use later to derive the number of firms for
a given labor allocation to manufacturing. Equating (5.1) and (5.2) we obtain,
after some rearranging of terms,
σ
Ls
2H
µ
2n− 1
n2
¶2
+
µ
Ls
2H
− ασ
¶µ
2n− 1
n2
¶
− ασ = 0. (5.3)
It is apparent from the signs of the coeﬃcients that there is only one positive root
for the “unknown” (2n− 1)/n2. Let this root be denoted by r > 0.9 This unique
positive root is a decreasing function of the density of workers, Ls/2H.
To obtain n, we solve the quadratic equation
rn2 − 2n+ 1 = 0. (5.4)
9We can also see this by noting that supply in (5.1) increases uniformly in n, whereas demand
in (5.2) decreases, so there is a unique intersection in supply demand space.
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Because r > 0, therer are either two positive solutions for n or none. The condition
that ensures that there are non-trivial solutions is r < 1. Making use of (5.3) this
imposes a feasible range on the density of workers
Ls
2H
>
2ασ
σ + 1
. (5.5)
Intuitively, labor market equilibrium is consistent with the existence of a positive
number of firms only if the number of workers in the sector exceeds a critical
value given by the parameters of the production and demand functions. Below
this critical value no firm will find it optimal to enter the sector. We show in
the next section that there is a unique solution for Ls in terms of the model’s
parameters, so (5.5) can be interpreted as a restriction on the feasible range of
the parameters.
6. Aggregate equilibrium
To derive the aggregate equilibrium we need to derive an expression for national
income and the allocation of labor between sectors. National income is
Y =WsLs +WaLa, (6.1)
whereWs is the mean manufacturing wage per person, which, by the argument of
section 3.2 is equal to w(1−H/2N). With the normalization Wa ≡ 1 and noting
that La = L− Ls, national income becomes
Y = L+ (Ws − 1)Ls. (6.2)
Our next task is to relate aggregate demand to labor income and here results
depend on whether there is trade or not.
6.1. No trade equilibrium
Suppose first there is no trade in equilibrium, for example, let τ → ∞ in all ex-
pressions. Output market clearing and zero manufacturing profits then imply that
the domestic demand for manufacturing is equal to total manufacturing income,
i.e., µY =WsLs. Substitution into (6.2) yields
Ls =
µ
(1− µ)Ws + µ
L. (6.3)
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In this economy, because both agricultural and manufacturing goods are produced
in equilibrium, the market clearing condition (3.11) must hold. Therefore the
equilibrium number of skilled workers is
Ls =
µ
(1− µ)t+ µL. (6.4)
With knowledge of Ls the other variables are immediately obtained. The key
variable n is obtained from (5.3) and there are two feasible solutions.
We illustrate the autarkic equilibrium with a diagram that will be useful in the
later analysis. The diagram, figure 2, gives the equilibrium relationship between
per-person wages in manufacturing and the number of firms. The horizontal line
SS is the market clearing condition (3.11). It plays the role of a labor supply
curve. The DD lines show the number of firms at given wage rate derived from
the demand side of the model. We saw that (5.4) implies that there are two
solutions for n. By diﬀerentiation, and noting that r < 1 and n > 1 in the feasible
range, we find that the larger solution decreases in r but the smaller one increases
in it. Therefore, since r decreases in Ls and Ls decreases inWs, the larger solution
must be decreasing inWs but the smaller solution increasing. The DD lines show
the two solutions as functions of Ws. The larger solution is well behaved, in the
sense that a lower wage rate attracts more firms into the market in each case. But
the smaller solution is “unstable,” in the sense that a lower wage rate makes firms
exit the manufacturing sector. We choose the larger solution as the equilibrium,
i.e., in equilibrium the density of firms n satisfies
n = r−1 + r−1(1− r)1/2, (6.5)
where r is the unique positive root of (5.3). In the neighborhood of equilibrium
the density of firms increases in the labor force and in the share of manufacturing
goods in consumer expenditure but decreases in the degree of heterogeneity, as
measured by H.
6.2. Trade equilibrium
With trade, the output of each manufacturing firm has to satisfy both domestic
consumption and exports. Substitution into the demand functions (4.3) of ag-
gregate income for each country from (6.2), and the aggregate price indices from
(3.4), yields
x = µp−σ
·
(Ws − 1)Ls + L
Np1−σ +N∗(τp∗)1−σ
+
τ 1−σ[(W ∗s − 1)L∗s + L∗]
N(τp)1−σ +N∗p∗1−σ
¸
, (6.6)
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x∗ = µp∗−σ
·
τ 1−σ[(Ws − 1)Ls + L]
Np1−σ +N∗(τp∗)1−σ
+
(W ∗s − 1)L∗s + L∗
N(τp)1−σ +N∗p∗1−σ
¸
. (6.7)
Under free trade, τ = 1 and the terms in the square brackets of (6.6) and (6.7)
become identical. Therefore, free trade equilibrium yields, after dividing (6.6) by
(6.7),
x
x∗
=
µ
p
p∗
¶−σ
. (6.8)
Making use of (4.7) and (4.6) we re-write (6.8) as
1 + σ(2n∗ − 1)/n∗2
1 + σ(2n− 1)/n2 =
µ
w(1 + (2n− 1)/n2)
w∗(1 + (2n∗ − 1)/n∗2)
¶−σ
(6.9)
The mean manufacturing wage in each country is given by the product w(1 −
H/2N), so
Ws
W ∗s
=
w(1− 1/2n)
w∗(1− 1/2n∗) . (6.10)
Substitution of w/w∗ from (6.10) into (6.9) yields
Ws
W ∗s
=
µ
1 + σ(2n− 1)/n2
1 + σ(2n∗ − 1)/n∗2
¶1/σ
1 + (2n∗ − 1)/n∗2
1 + (2n− 1)/n2
1− 1/2n
1− 1/2n∗ . (6.11)
Equation (6.11) replaces the demand for labor function DD of figure 2, to give
the free trade equilibrium. Although it is in relative terms, we show that it can
determine equilibrium in the two economies in the same way as figure 2 did for a
single economy under autarky. We plot (6.11) in figure 3 for the domestic economy
when foreign wages are at their equilibrium value t and the number of firms is at
the right-hand intersection of figure 2, denoted as N∗ in figure 3. Holding foreign
wages and the number of foreign manufacturing firms constant, we diﬀerentiate
(6.11) with respect to the domestic number of firms n to obtain ∂Ws/∂n > 0.
The relation between domestic wages and the domestic number of firms is shown
as DD in figure 3. DD cuts the equilibrium at N∗, because a symmetric free-
trade equilibrium always exists. But the domestic equilibrium is “unstable”. If a
small number of firms is shifted from the foreign to the home economy wages in
the home economy rise, attracting more workers into manufacturing, and foreign
wages fall, discouraging the movement into manufacturing.
The intuition for the instability with free trade is this. When a firm moves
from the foreign country to the home country, the world demand for its output is
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unaﬀected. But in the labor market two forces are at work. The larger number of
firms increases competition for workers and the markup of prices on wages falls.
This force works against agglomeration. But because there are now more firms
in the domestic economy the quality of matches improves. The firm could pay
the same wage for each eﬀective unit of labor and pass on the improvement in
the quality of matches to workers, attracting more workers into the manufactur-
ing sector. With more workers attracted, the negative eﬀects from the increased
competition for workers are oﬀset. A complementarity comes into force: when a
manufacturing firm leaves the foreign country and joins the home one, more work-
ers at home train and join the manufacturing sector. With completely free trade
the complementarity oﬀsets the negative eﬀects of the competition for workers and
leads to complete specialization; i.e., in the case where the manufacturing sector is
less than half the world economy, all manufacturing firms leave the foreign country
and join the home one.
The complementarity may fail with suﬃciently high trade costs. If there are
trade costs, when the firm leaves the foreign country to join the home one foreign
consumers have to pay the trade cost to buy its output and it has to compete with
other home firms for domestic aggregate demand. This induces a fall in the firm’s
output price and in the eﬀective wage rate. The lower eﬀective wage acts as a
disincentive to training, which, if suﬃciently strong, oﬀsets the incentive coming
from the better matches. In the diagram, the critical point where the two forces
exactly balance each other out takes place when the DD curve becomes a vertical
line.
7. Numerical simulations
We use numerical simulations to illustrate both the nature of free-trade equilib-
rium and the consequences of intermediate trading costs when (a) countries are
of equal size (L = L∗) and (b) countries diﬀer in size (L < L∗).
7.1. Equal country size
At intermediate levels of trade costs, the equilibrium outcome will either be a
diversified (symmetric) equilibrium with both countries producing manufactures
and N = N∗, or an agglomerated equilibrium. In the agglomeration case we sup-
pose that manufacturing agglomerates in the “home” country. An agglomerated
equilibrium involves both countries producing agricultural goods if the share of
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manufactures in consumption, µ, is less than a half; in this case the mean skilled
wage is constrained to equal Ws = t. However, if µ > 1/2, an agglomerated equi-
librium involves the home country producing only manufactures and the foreign
country producing both agriculture and manufacturing. In this case, the skilled
wage distribution in the home country depends on the value of marginal product
of labor in manufactures, which is greater than t . Although we discuss both
cases, we continue to focus on the case µ < 1/2 (hence, our “manufacturing” is a
small specialized sector of the economy that employs skilled labor).
We investigate the existence of an agglomerated equilibrium in two ways. First,
we compute an equilibrium when trade costs are suﬃciently high to give symmetry
and no trade. We then compute the equilibrium implied by lower levels of trade
costs, holding all other parameters fixed. The point at which the equilibrium
switches from symmetry and no trade to agglomeration with trade is known in the
new economic geography literature as the “break point.”10 In a second experiment
our initial equilibrium is an agglomerated one with low trade costs, and investigate
whether there are trade costs that imply profitable deviations for one or more
firms. The point at which this is observed is known as the “sustain point.”
To find the break point, τ(B), we ensure that at the initial value of trade
costs firms make zero profits in symmetric equilibrium. Firms make zero profits
when equations (6.6) and (6.7) are satisfied (with prices substituted out by making
use of equation (3.11) and (4.6)). If there are trade costs at which demand in a
country exceeds the zero-profit output level, given by equation (4.7), firms find it
profitable to enter that country, whereas when demand falls short of (4.7) firms
exit. To see if there are any profitable deviations at lower trade costs we check
whether total demand for goods produced in the home country, given by equation
(6.6), is higher than the zero profit output level. If so, there are profitable entry
opportunities and the symmetric equilibrium breaks. This critical value for the
benchmark case is found to be τ(B) = 1.19 and illustrated in figure 411. The
implication is that when trade costs fall below 19% of the producer price, a small
group of firms could break the symmetric equilibrium by leaving their country
and locating in the other, inducing agglomeration.
To find the sustain point (in the case µ < 1/2) we set N > 0, N∗ = 0 with
N chosen such that firms earn zero profit. This agglomeration is an equilibrium
when no firm can make positive profits by moving from the home to the foreign
10See Fujita et al (1999), p. 9.
11The benchmark parameter values for all of the simulations are as follows: σ = 4, α = 1/σ.
In Figure 4, we set L = L∗ = 100, µ = 0.40, H = 1.0, t = 1.1 and L = L∗ = 100.
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country. Figure 4 shows that for trade costs below τ(S) = 2.48 no firm will find it
optimal to deviate but at higher trade costs the agglomeration equilibrium is not
sustainable. In general, the sustain point is higher than the break point, i.e., an
agglomeration can be an equilibrium at levels of trade costs that are too high to
render a symmetric equilibrium unstable. At such levels of trade costs, between
τ(B) and τ(S), there are multiple equilibria.
Table 1 summarizes the results for diﬀerent values of H and t for the case
when (a) countries are of equal size; and (b) the home country is smaller than
the foreign country. The results indicate that reducing either t or H reduces both
the critical break and sustain points. The lower is the heterogeneity, the weaker
are the agglomeration forces, hence agglomeration requires a lower level of trade
costs. For example, when t = 1.1 and L = L∗ = 100 reducing H from 1.5 to
0.5 reduces the break point from τ(B) = 1.24 to τ(B) = 1.13 and the sustain
point from τ(S) = 3.37 to τ(S) = 1.76. Agglomeration is an equilibrium at all
levels of trade costs equal to or less than these critical values. The results are
quantitatively the same when µ > 1/2. However, in all cases both the critical and
sustain points are lower for higher values of µ.When µ is high the share of income
spent on the cost of importing goods is high hence lower trade costs are necessary
for an agglomeration.
7.2. Diﬀerent Country size
Allowing countries to diﬀer in market size (L < L∗) creates an additional tension
as firms are drawn to the large market to save on trade costs. In new economic
geography models generally, a country that has the initial head start in terms of
size is the more profitable location for an agglomeration.12 Interestingly in our
model, the agglomeration does not necessarily locate in the large country because
the source of agglomeration arises in the skilled labor market. So the benefit
of locating in a country with a larger pool of skilled labor could outweigh the
benefit of locating in a large market for goods. For L = 100 and L∗ = 120, the
critical and sustain points are reported in Table 1. For H = 1.0 and t = 1.10, the
break point in the larger country is τ(B) = 1.30 and all firms agglomerate in it
at lower trade costs. But at trade costs below τ(B) = 1.01 (noting that τ ≥ 1),
12The statement is correct under the assumption that the economy moves to the nearest stable
equilibrium, ignoring global stability properties: agents are assumed to be myopic with workers
only moving in response to current wage diﬀerences and firms responding to current diﬀerences
in profitable opportunities. See Fujita et al. (1999, p.7) for justification of these assumptions.
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the agglomeration can locate in the smaller home country too. A larger skilled
labour pool can tip the scales in favour of the home country. Agglomeration in the
smaller country is more likely to be the case the higher the heterogeneity and the
cost of training. In free trade, agglomeration will always be an equilibrium in the
country with the larger initial pool of skilled labor: the market size eﬀect becomes
irrelevant, except to the extent that it influences the initial pool of skilled labor.
Agglomeration in the small country is also an equilibrium at higher levels of
trade costs. Starting with an agglomeration, we find that the critical sustain
points in the smaller country are always less than in the larger country, as we
expect, but at suﬃciently low trade costs an agglomeration equilibrium can be
sustainable in the smaller country too. At the benchmark H = 1.0 and t = 1.10,
these trade costs can be as high as τ ≤ 2.38.
With diﬀerent country sizes, an equilibrium with agglomeration in the home
country may consist of the home country only producing manufactures even when
µ < 0.5, in which case workers would be paid an amount that is proportional to
the value of their marginal product in manufactures. The smaller country could
end up with a higher total income than the larger country.
8. Welfare
The welfare eﬀects of trade in our model depend on the level of trade costs and
the size of the manufacturing sector. We illustrate only the case of “trade liberal-
ization” when the two countries are of equal size, but both for a small and a large
manufacturing sector. We interpret trade liberalization as meaning a gradual re-
duction of trade costs. The relevant critical point in this case is the break point:
starting from high costs and symmetric equilibrium we reduce trade costs to zero
and compute each country’s and the world’s welfare as the equilibrium changes
form the symmetric to the agglomeration one. We compute welfare by making use
of equation (3.9) and aggregating across all individuals k. The results are shown
in figure 5, panel (a) for µ < 1/2 and panel (b) for µ > 1/2.
Aggregate utility levels are equal in the two countries in the symmetric equi-
librium. As trade costs fall, both countries’ welfare improves because they have
access to more varieties through trade. When the break point is reached manu-
facturing firms agglomerate in the home country. At this point, the welfare in the
home country jumps up because its consumers pay less for transportation (nothing
in the case of a small manufacturing sector, when all manufactures are produced
in the home country) but the welfare in the foreign country jumps down because
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consumers have to pay more transport costs. In the case of small manufacturing
sector world welfare rises with the agglomeration, but in the case of a large man-
ufacturing sector, the fact that there is a lot more concentration of activity and
trade now reduces world welfare. As trade costs continue to fall welfare increases
in the foreign country.
In the case of small µ welfare in the foreign country and in the world eventually
reach a higher level than the level of welfare reached at the symmetric equilibrium.
In free trade, the utility levels are the same in both countries. Even though the
home country has all the skilled workers, the utility of skilled and unskilled workers
is the same by the assumption of inter-sectoral mobility of labor and because both
countries have an active agricultural sector.
But when µ > 1/2 the mean skilled wage in the home country is no longer
constrained to equal t in the agglomerated equilibrium. The initial jump in welfare
in the home country is higher but this does not necessarily compensate for the
losses in the foreign country. The sum of the two countries’ utilities may be lower
in free trade than for intermediate levels of trade costs, because of the price eﬀects
of free trade. In the home country, the price of manufacturing goods jumps up
with agglomeration because prices are a mark-up on marginal cost, which increase
because of the increase in the skilled wage rate. The increase in wages in the
home country more than oﬀsets the price eﬀects but not in the foreign country,
where wages are tied down by productivity in the agricultural sector. Welfare in
the foreign country suﬀers further from the lower productivity in manufacturing,
which follows the exit of firms after agglomeration. The combination of higher
prices in the home country and lower productivity in the foreign country may
actually make foreign consumers worse oﬀ even with zero trade costs.13
9. Conclusions
The availability of large quantities of qualified labor in a local market is often
invoked as a force for the agglomeration of economic activity. In this paper we
showed how this could arise in a market characterized by heterogeneity of skills,
even when the heterogeneity gives monopoly power to firms. The key to our model
13Clearly, in the case of a large manufacturing sector a welfare-improving move would be to
allow international migration. International migration would allow all manufacturing firms to
locate in one country, which would improve welfare for two reasons. It would keep manufacturing
wages and prices low through the more abundant supply of labor and it would improve the quality
of matches through the larger pool of both firms and labor
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is that firms prefer to enter a market that already has a large pool of labor and
firms, and so forego some of their monopoly power, than enter an isolated market
and train their own workers, because in the former case they can choose the most
suitable employees, whereas in the latter they have to rely on luck to find a good
match. Agglomeration fails in our model only if trade costs are suﬃciently high to
make it more profitable for firms to locate in the market that they supply, rather
than in the one that their labor productivity is highest.
We cited anecdotal and econometric evidence by others on the advantages of
labor pooling. Our analysis has narrowed the types of labor and the reasons that
labor pooling is advantageous, and a necessary next step is to look for these in the
data. Two forces in particular appear to be consistent with casual observation:
that there should be more agglomeration of small high-tech industries than of the
larger and heavier type of industry and that agglomeration and wage inequality
should increase as trade costs come down. Testing whether this is true and whether
the reasons are related to the matching of skills is a theme for future research.
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Table 1
“Break” and “sustain” points for trade costs at diﬀerent values of parameters
L = L∗ = 100 L = 100 < L∗ = 120
µ = 0.4 µ = 0.6 µ = 0.4
Both countries Both countries Home Foreign Home Foreign
H t τ(B) τ(S) τ(B) τ(S) τ(B) τ(B) τ(S) τ(S)
1.5 1.15 1.25 3.43 1.21 2.71 1.01 1.37 3.29 3.50
1.5 1.10 1.24 3.37 1.19 2.67 1.01 1.36 3.24 3.45
1.5 1.05 1.22 3.32 1.18 2.63 1.01 1.35 3.19 3.40
1.0 1.15 1.20 2.51 1.17 2.00 1.01 1.32 2.41 2.57
1.0 1.10 1.19 2.48 1.15 1.97 1.01 1.30 2.38 2.53
1.0 1.05 1.18 2.44 1.14 1.94 1.00 1.29 2.34 2.49
0.5 1.15 1.14 1.79 1.12 1.39 1.00 1.24 1.72 1.83
0.5 1.10 1.13 1.76 1.11 1.37 1.00 1.23 1.69 1.80
0.5 1.05 1.12 1.73 1.09 1.34 1.00 1.22 1.66 1.77
Notes. The values taken by the other parameters are σ = 4, and α = 1/σ.
H measures the degree of heterogeneity and t the training cost. At trade costs
above τ(B) the symmetric equilibrium can be broken and at points below τ(S)
the agglomeration equilibrium becomes unsustainable.
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